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McConnell v. State, 102 P.3d 606 (Nev. 2004), 120 Nev. Adv. Rep. 105 
[MCCONNELL I] 
 
CRIMINAL LAW – SENTENCING 
 
Summary 
 
Appellant Robert McConnell murdered Brian Pierce in August 2002. The State of 
Nevada charged McConnell with first-degree murder and sought capital sentencing.  The 
State alleged two theories: deliberate, premeditated murder and felony murder during the 
perpetration of a burglary.   
 
McConnell represented himself, pleaded guilty to first-degree murder, and presented a 
case in mitigation at his penalty hearing.  The jury returned a sentence of death. Initially, 
McConnell moved to waive his appeal but eventually reconsidered and authorized 
counsel to fully brief all issues on appeal. 
 
Specifically, McConnell challenged the propriety of his penalty hearing and death 
sentence on various grounds.  The court found, in all but one instance, his claims had no 
merit.  The one issue which the court addressed in depth was McConnell’s argument that 
because the aggravating circumstance of burglary also served as an element of felony 
murder, it thereby failed to perform its constitutional function of narrowing death 
eligibility.   
  
Issue and Disposition 
 
Issue 
 
In a prosecution seeking death for a felony murder, does an aggravator based on 
the underlying felony constitutionally narrow death eligibility? Specifically, does the 
felony aggravator set forth in NRS 200.033(4) adequately perform a narrowing function 
for felony murder?1 
 
 Disposition 
 
No.  The court concluded that in a prosecution seeking death for a felony murder, 
an aggravator based on the underlying felony did not constitutionally narrow death 
eligibility. However, because McConnell admitted to deliberate, premeditated murder, 
                                                 
1 NEVADA REVISED STATUTE 200.033(4) (2004) provides that first-degree murder is aggravated if:  
committed during the commission of, or an attempt to commit, or flight after committing 
or attempting to commit, any robbery, arson in the first degree, burglary, invasion of the 
home or kidnapping in the first degree, and the person charged: 
(a) Killed or attempted to kill the person murdered; or 
(b) Knew or had reason to know that life would be taken or lethal force used. 
 
 2
the State's alternative theory of felony murder was of no consequence and provides no 
ground for relief. 
 
 
Commentary 
 
 State of the Law Before McConnell v. State 
 
  Nevada’s Supreme Court, in 1985, addressed the contention that the underlying 
felony within a felony-murder prosecution cannot be considered as an aggravating 
circumstance and rejected the argument. 2  Reasoning that "the U.S. Supreme Court has 
implicitly approved the use of the underlying felony in felony murder cases as a valid 
aggravating circumstance to support the imposition of the death sentence," the court in 
Petrocelli v. State established the judicial standard for Nevada on this issue.3 Nevada 
courts have followed Petrocelli's rationale ever since.4  In 1988, however, the United 
States Supreme Court, in Lowenfield v. Phelps,5 dealt with a challenge to a death 
sentence on the basis that the sole aggravating circumstance was identical to an element 
of the capital murder.6   The case at issue was the Nevada high court’s first attempt to 
reconcile the Petrocelli standard with Lowenfield. 
 
In Nevada, the felony aggravator applies only to cases where the defendant "killed 
or attempted to kill" the victim or "knew or had reason to know that life would be taken 
or lethal force used."7  This adds an element not strictly required for felony murder. 
 
 Effect of McConnell v. State on Current Law 
 
The Nevada Supreme Court concluded that Lowenfield explicitly provides the 
basic analytical framework to approach this issue.  To be constitutional, a capital 
sentencing scheme "must genuinely narrow the class of persons eligible for the death 
penalty and must reasonably justify the imposition of a more severe sentence on the 
defendant compared to others found guilty of murder."8  
 
As noted in Lowenfield, the required narrowing function within any capital 
punishment scheme may be achieved in one of two ways: 1) The legislature may itself 
narrow the definition of capital offenses so that a jury finding of guilt is already narrow; 
                                                 
2 Petrocelli v. State, 692 P.2d 503 (Nev. 1985), holding modified on other grounds by Sonner v. State, 955 
P.2d 673, 677 (Nev. 1998). 
3 Id. at 509 (emphasis added) (citing Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 
(1976) (plurality opinion)). 
4 See, e.g., Atkins v. State, 923 P.2d 1119, 1127 (1996). 
5 484 U.S. 231, 241-46 (1988). 
6 See Leslie v. Warden, Ely State Prison, 59 P.3d 440, 448-49 (2002) (Maupin, J., concurring) (discussing 
Lowenfield and this issue). 
7 Supra note 1. 
8 Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 877 (1983). 
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or, the legislature may broadly define capital offenses and narrow, following conviction, 
through jury findings of aggravating circumstances during the penalty phase.9 
 
In Nevada, all felony murder is first-degree murder, and all first-degree murder is 
potentially capital murder.  The Nevada legislature elected to statutorily define felony 
murder rather broadly. Under NRS 200.030(1)(b), felony murder is defined as a murder 
during one of any of an enumerated list of felonies, specifically "committed in the 
perpetration or attempted perpetration of sexual assault, kidnapping, arson, robbery, 
burglary, invasion of the home, sexual abuse of a child, sexual molestation of a child 
under the age of 14 years or child abuse."   
 
Nevada's statute enumerates two more predicate felonies than Louisiana's capital 
felony-murder statute in Lowenfield, and some of Nevada’s predicate felonies are 
multiple, e.g., either degree of kidnapping.10  More important though, in Nevada, the 
intent simply to commit the underlying felony is "transferred to supply the malice 
necessary to characterize the death a murder." This element of the felony aggravator 
largely mirrors the constitutional standard and does little to narrow the class of death-
eligible defendants.  
 
The end result is that the court, here, overturned Petrocelli and established that it 
is constitutionally impermissible, under the Nevada Constitution, to base an aggravating 
circumstance in a capital prosecution on the felony upon which a felony murder is 
predicated. 
 
Ultimately, this decision has no effect where the State gains a first-degree murder 
conviction solely on a theory of deliberate, premeditated murder; it may then use 
appropriate associated felonies as aggravators.11 Where the State bases a first-degree 
murder conviction in whole or part on felony murder, the State may not seek capital 
punishment based on the felony murder’s predicate felony as an aggravator.12 
 
 
Other Jurisdictions 
 
A number of other courts have considered this issue since Lowenfield was 
decided. Opinions determining that use of the felony in a felony murder as an aggravator 
                                                 
9 484 U.S. at 246. 
10 Compare id. at 246 (enumerating only "aggravated kidnapping" in Louisiana). 
11 McConnell , 102 P.3d at 624. 
12 Id.  Further, the court prohibits the State from  
selecting among multiple felonies that occur during "an indivisible course of conduct 
having one principal criminal purpose" using one to establish felony murder and another 
to support an aggravating circumstance. For example, in a case like this one, the burglary 
could not be used to establish first-degree felony murder while the associated robbery 
was used as an aggravator to support a death sentence. The burglary and robbery both 
occurred in an indivisible course of conduct whose primary purpose was the murder of 
Pierce.  Id. at 624-25. 
 
 4
was proper include: Deputy v. Taylor, 19 F.3d 1485, 1500-02 (3d Cir. 1994); Perry v. 
Lockhart, 871 F.2d 1384, 1392-93 (8th Cir. 1989); and Ferguson v. State, 642 A.2d 772, 
780-81 (Del. 1994).  
 
Opinions determining that such use was not proper include: State v. 
Middlebrooks, 840 S.W.2d 317, 341-47 (Tenn. 1992), superseded by statute as stated in 
State v. Stout, 46 S.W.3d 689, 705-06 (Tenn. 2001); and Engberg v. Meyer, 820 P.2d 70, 
86-92 (Wyo. 1991). 
 
Unanswered Questions 
 
It would seem that the “single course of conduct” test, for determining whether or 
not aggravators may be separately assigned to base a felony murder on one felony and 
then base an aggravator on an associated felony, may become an issue in future caselaw.  
Where the conduct is not specifically directed toward the resulting homicide, but occurs 
within the same flow of events, it is unclear from the court’s examples whether such a 
felony would be rendered ineligible under the test. 
 
Conclusion 
 
A single felony may not be used both to establish first-degree murder and to 
aggravate the murder to capital status. Similarly, multiple felonies within a “single course 
of conduct” may not be separated for purposes of supporting both felony murder and 
aggravating circumstances in sentencing.  The interpretation of Nevada’s death penalty 
statutes, as noted in this case, provides a more certain framework within which Nevada 
prosecutors may exercise their discretion, and “enhances certainty and fairness of 
application within the trial, appellate, and federal court systems.”13  
                                                 
13 Id. 
